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INTRODUCTION
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Washington
guarantees, “Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay.”1 The Washington State Supreme Court has
interpreted this clause to guarantee the public a right to attend legal proceedings and to access court documents separate and apart from the
rights of the litigants themselves.2 Based on this interpretation, the court
has struck down laws protecting the identity of both juvenile victims of
sexual assault and individuals subject to involuntary commitment hearings. Its interpretation has also compromised the privacy rights of litigants wrongly named in legal proceedings.3 The court has supported
these rulings by claiming that the public’s right of access to the courts “is
rooted in centuries-old English common law.”4
A dispassionate examination of the history of English common law
does not support the court’s interpretation of history. While there was a
tradition of publicly held legal proceedings at English common law,
there was no right of the public to attend such proceedings. A criminal
defendant’s right to a public proceeding was first articulated in the
American colonies.5 It was not until 1975 that Washington courts found
members of the public to have a right independent of the litigants themselves. Given this historical context, the Washington State Supreme
Court should reign in its extreme open courts jurisprudence by adopting
a more narrowly tailored balancing test to determine when the public
should have a right to access legal proceedings or court documents. Such
an interpretation would give more weight to the privacy rights of individuals impacted by litigation.
Part I of this Article engages in a detailed exploration of the history
of the right of public access to legal proceedings and court records, going
back to Magna Carta of 1215 and other historical accounts of English
common law. It also explores the tradition of publicly held proceedings,
as well as the articulation of defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights under
the United States Constitution and other early colonial documents. The
Article then considers the history of Article I, Section 10 of Washington’s constitution, the “Open Courts Clause,”6 and the early interpretations of the state constitution. From there, it examines the more recent
1. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10.
2. See infra Part I.D.
3. See infra text accompanying note 121.
4. Cohen v. Everett City Council, 535 P.2d 801, 803 (Wash. 1975) (citing In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257, 266 (1948)).
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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precedent, where the independent right of the public is articulated. Part II
of this Article urges Washington courts to reexamine the Experience and
Logic Test, which has been adopted by the Washington State Supreme
Court to guide the lower courts’ application of the “Open Courts
Clause.” Finally, Part III of this Article contends that certain cases may
need to be reexamined in light of the court’s adoption of the Experience
and Logic Test.
I. A HISTORY OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
The Washington State Supreme Court has waxed poetic about what
it believes to be a storied history of public access to legal proceedings:
Open access to the courts is grounded in our common law heritage and our national and state constitutions. For centuries publicity
has been a check on the misuse of both political and judicial power.
As a leading theorist of the Enlightenment wrote:
Let the verdicts and proofs of guilt be made public, so that
opinion, which is, perhaps, the sole cement of society, may
serve to restrain power and passions; so that the people may
say, we are not slaves, and we are protected—a sentiment
which inspires courage and which is the equivalent of a
tribute to a sovereign who knows his own true interests.
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 22 (Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs–Merrill Co., Inc.1963) (1764).
Proceedings cloaked in secrecy foster mistrust and, potentially,
misuse of power.7

Washington State Supreme Court opinions have referenced the right of
the public to view legal proceedings to be “at the core of our system of
justice,” a “bedrock foundation,”8 and a “vital constitutional safeguard.”9
However, history does not support these sweeping claims. It was not
until 1975, in Cohen v. Everett City Council, that the Washington State
Supreme Court interpreted Article I, Section 10 of the Washington constitution as granting the public a right to access legal proceedings that
was separate from the right of the litigants.10 Prior to 1975, the jurisprudence on the right to publicly held legal proceedings had been limited to
the context of criminal trials, and even that right dates back to the American colonies, not English common law.

7. Dreiling v. Jain, 93 P.3d 861, 866 (Wash. 2004).
8. State v. S.J.C., 352 P.3d 749, 763 (Wash. 2015).
9. Hundtofte v. Encarnación, 330 P.3d 168, 172 (Wash. 2014).
10. Cohen v. Everett City Council, 535 P.2d 801, 803 (Wash. 1975).
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A. Public Proceedings at English Common Law
At the time of the Norman Conquest, the English legal system included a hodgepodge of different courts. There were “communal courts,”
such as the County Court, the Hundred Court, and the Curia Regis (also
known as the King’s Court).11 There were also private or franchise
courts.12 The private courts were relics of a feudal system in which large
landowners exercised a broad reign over an entire region.13 The descriptions of the County Court and the Hundred Court include specific,
predetermined days on which court would be held.14 They also included
a system of mandatory court attendance for local land owners, although
such duties were often assigned to the tenants or other subjects.15 These
descriptions lead to a presumption that most legal proceedings of the
communal courts were conducted in public. However, there is no historical record indicating that litigants had a right to publicly held legal proceedings or that members of the public had a right to attend such proceedings. Moreover, the presumption of openness would not have applied to the private or franchise courts.
Many legal scholars look to Magna Carta,16 also known as The
Great Charter of 1215, and its subsequent iterations, as one of the earliest
records of English common law rights. Magna Carta was a charter first
drafted by the Archbishop of Canterbury to make peace between the unpopular King John and a group of rebel barons.17 In the charter, King
John made promises regarding protection of church rights, protection of
the barons from illegal imprisonment, access to swift justice, and limitation on payments by the barons to the crown.18
Magna Carta is generally divided into 63 clauses.19 Clauses 17
through 20 detail how and where lawsuits should be litigated and require
that courts meet on predetermined days in each county four times per
year.20 Much like the County and Hundred Courts, courts that met in
compliance with Magna Carta were scheduled at a predetermined time
11. 1 SIR WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 17–24 (Methuen, 7th
ed. 1966) (1903).
12. Id. at 3–24.
13. Id. at 17–24.
14. Id. at 11.
15. Id. at 11–12.
16. The words “Magna Carta” are generally translated as “The Great Charter” including the
article “the,” so the authors refer to Magna Carta in this Article without using an additional article.
17. Claire Breay & Julian Harrison, Magna Carta: An Introduction, BRIT. LIBR.,
http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-an-introduction (last visited May 23, 2016).
18. English Translation of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR., http://www.bl.uk/magnacarta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation (last visited May 23, 2016).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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and place, thus it would have been possible for members of the public to
observe the proceedings.
While Magna Carta appears to assume that many legal proceedings
would be conducted in public, as was the practice of the time, the charter
does not explicitly guarantee a right to the public or to individual litigants to have proceedings occur in public. However, many other rights
are described in Magna Carta explicitly and in great detail, including
how many days a widow may remain in her deceased husband’s house,21
when and how interest may accrue on a debt,22 when a person can be
forced to build bridges,23 and so on.
Clause 40 of Magna Carta reads as follows: “Nulli vendemus, nulli
negabimus, aut differemus rectum aut justiciam,” which has been translated as “To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.”24 This clause is referenced as a source for many subsequent constitutional provisions that articulate a right to “open courts.”25 However,
here, the term “open courts” applies not to a right of the public to attend
legal proceedings, nor to a right of litigants to have their case conducted
in public; rather, it applies to the right of litigants to have their case heard
and resolved by the court, without having to pay for the privilege. Specifically, the words “to no one deny . . . justice” are the words that scholars
point to for this proposition.26 In other words, the courts will be open to
all litigants for the resolution of their disputes.
This is an important distinction and one that some scholars have
conflated.27 It is correct to say that the concept of open courts dates to
Magna Carta if one is referring to a prohibition on the sale of writs and
the courts being open to litigants to resolve their disputes. However, it is
not accurate to say open courts, as in a right to a publicly held legal proceeding, dates back to Magna Carta.
In the mid-1500s, Sir Thomas Smith, an English diplomat who
served in France, wrote a treatise on the system of English government

21. Id. cl. 7.
22. Id. cl. 10.
23. Id. cl. 23.
24. Id. cl. 40. Magna Carta was written by King John and addressed to the barons; “we” refers
to King John or the crown.
25. See Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser, An Open Courts Checklist: Clarifying Washington’s
Public Trial and Public Access Jurisprudence, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1203, 1206 n.17 (2012); see also
Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State
Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1995); David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP.
L. REV. 1197, 1199–200 (1992).
26. RAYMOND B. STRINGHAM, MAGNA CARTA: FOUNTAINHEAD OF FREEDOM 54–56 (1966).
27. See sources cited supra note 25.
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titled De Republica Anglorum.28 According to Sir Thomas Smith, part of
the reason that the English legal system required members of the public
to be present was because of the relatively sparse written documentation
of legal proceedings:
[A]lthough it will seeme straunge to all nations that doe use the civill Lawe of the Romane Emperours, that for life and death there is
nothing put in writing but the enditement onely. All the rest is
doone openlie in the presence of the Judges, the Justices, the
enquest, the prisoner, and so manie as will or can come so neare as
to heare it, and all depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all
men may heare from the mouth of the depositors and witnesses
what is saide.29

According to Sir Thomas Smith’s description, the public nature of trials
in England can be understood as an artifact of the need to create a record,
rather than a right of the accused or a right of the public to view the proceedings.
Another potential source of the right to publicly held legal proceedings was the backlash to the Star Chamber.30 The Star Chamber was a
court with a wide-ranging jurisdiction derived from an ancient concept of
“King in Council.”31 The court rose in prominence after the passage of
the Star Chamber Act in 1487,32 and it was abolished in 1641 by an act
of Parliament.33 But contemporary complaints about the abuses of the
Star Chamber do not include criticism of the closed nature of the court’s
proceedings.34 While it is true that the procedures of the Star Chamber
required a defendant to be “examined privately by the examiner, an official of the court, neither his counsel nor any co-defendant being present
28. SIR THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM (L. Alston ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1906) (1584).
29. Id. at 100.
30. See Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917). “The provision is one of the
important safeguards that were soon deemed necessary to round out the Constitution, and it was due
to the historical warnings of the evil practice of the Star Chamber in England.” Id.
31. Marvin M. Lomax, The Court of Star Chamber – A Tudor Creation?, 45 PROC. OKLA.
ACAD. SCI., 167, 169 (1965).
32. Id.
33. See Edward P. Cheyney, The Court of Star Chamber, 18 AM. HIST. REV. 727, 749 (1913).
34. Max Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 387 (1932).
The speech of Lord Andover against the Star Chamber is almost exclusively
concerned with the vexation of the nobility by this court, but not one word about
its secrecy or its denial of the safeguards of liberty. Again, the long preamble of
the Act which abolished the Star Chamber, although it cites all the statutes from
Magna Charta down, which have anything to do with liberty of the subject and
denounces the Star Chamber for its arbitrary character and its excessive and unusual punishments, has not a word about the secrecy of its procedure.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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to advise him as to his answer[,]”35 the sessions of the court itself were
open to the public. It was the perceived arbitrariness and severity of the
court’s rulings, rather than the secrecy of its proceedings, that led to the
court’s demise.36
This analysis is bolstered by the fact that neither of the two most
significant documents articulating the rights of English citizens, which
were both drafted in the same century as the demise of the Star Chamber,
speak to a right to publicly held legal proceedings. The Petition of Rights
of 1628 was adopted by Parliament approximately thirteen years before
the Star Chamber was abolished, and the Bill of Rights of 1689 was
passed by Parliament forty-eight years after the Star Chamber was abolished.37 It seems logical to assume that if the secret nature of judicial
proceedings was truly a concern of the time, these documents would
have articulated a right to publicly conducted legal proceedings, but neither document includes such a right.
Some judges and scholars have pointed to the trial of LieutenantColonel John Lilburne in 1649 as evidence that English common law
included a right to be tried in public.38 Howell’s State Trials reports that
Lilburne stated:
I was sometimes summoned before a committee of parliament,
where Mr. Corbet, and several others have had the chair; and there I
stood upon my right by the laws of England, and refused to proceed
with the said committee, till by special order they caused their doors
to be wide thrown open, that the people might have free and uninterrupted access to hear, see and consider of what they said to
me . . . and I did refuse (as of right) to proceed with them, till by
special order they did open their doors.39

The problem with relying on this passage for the proposition that English
common law guaranteed criminal defendants a right to have their trials
occur in public is that the passage comes from a speech by the defendant
himself, not a ruling of the court. The defendant relates a situation in
which he refused to testify before a committee of the parliament as to the
allegations against him until the hearing was made public.

35. Cheyney, supra note 33, at 738.
36. Id. at 749.
37. Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Car 1, c.1; The Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2.
38. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387 n.18 (1979); In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 266 n.14 (1948); RICHARD GOLDFARB, TV OR NOT TV: TELEVISION, JUSTICE, AND THE
COURTS 44 (1998); SUSAN HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL 13–14 (2006).
39. The Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilburne, at the Guildhall of London for High Treason, [1649] 4 Ho. St. Tr. 1274 (Eng.), available at http://www.constitution.org/trials/howell/
04_howells_state_trials.pdf.
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In the same passage, the defendant complains that “as I came in, I
found the gates shut and guarded, which is contrary both to law and justice.”40 Judge Keble responds by saying, “Mr. Lilburne, look behind you,
and see whether the door stands open or no.”41 At this point, the defendant seems satisfied that his trial is being conducted in public and he resumes his complaints as to other injustices he is suffering. This exchange
bolsters the evidence that English common law included a tradition in
which trials were held in public, but Mr. Lilburne was unable to cite to
any authority for the proposition that he had a right to be tried in public,
and there is no evidence that the court ever made an explicit ruling as
such.
By the late 1600s, legal scholars were finally articulating arguments
about the importance of publicly held legal proceedings with particularity. Sir Matthew Hale in 1670 and Sir William Blackstone, who cited to
Hale during the same period, write about the importance that witnesses
be examined in public.42 It is possible that these scholars were contrasting the English common law system with the Roman system of civil
law or with the private examination of witnesses that was permitted in
the Star Chamber proceedings. However, neither scholar claimed that
defendants had a right to publicly held trials nor that the public had an
independent right to be present during legal proceedings.
B. Public Trial Rights in Colonial America
Early colonial charters had many divergent things to say on the use
of juries,43 but rarely mentioned that criminal trials should be public.
West New Jersey, however, in its Charter, did explicitly mention that
trials, both civil and criminal, were to be public. It stated:
That in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, civil or
criminal, any person or persons, inhabitants of the said Province
may freely come into, and attend the said courts, and hear and be
present, at all or any such tryals as shall be there had or passed, that
justice may not be done in a corner nor in any covert manner, being
intended and resolved, by the help of the Lord, and by these our
40. Id. at 1273.
41. Id. at 1274.
42. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND ch.12 (Charles M.
Gray, ed., Univ. Chicago Press 1971) (1670) (noting examination was undertaken “in the open court,
and in the presence of the parties, their attorneys, counsel and all bystanders”); 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *396 (“[The] open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of the truth.”).
43. See, e.g., The Massachusetts Body of Liberties §§ 30–31 (1641); The Charter of Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey ch. XXII (1676). For the text of these colonial charters, see 1
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 49–179 (1971).
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Concessions and Fundamentals, that all and every person and persons inhabiting the said Province, shall, as far as in us lies, be free
from oppression and slavery.44

Similar decrees for public trials exist in the Fundamental Constitutions
for the Province of East Jersey and in the early colonial codes in Pennsylvania.45
However, the provision regarding criminal procedure adopted by
the Constitutional Congress in 1787 makes no reference to the public
nature of trials. Many states adopted language in their own constitutions
protecting what they considered inviolable procedural safeguards for the
accused, including the right to be tried by a jury of twelve men of the
vicinage,46 public trials,47 as well as to the right to witnesses48 and to the
assistance of counsel.49 The language and substance of these protections
varied so widely that the delegates at the Constitutional Convention
made little to no effort to come to consensus.50 Many delegations were
upset by the proposal’s failure to protect more of the accused’s rights in
the Constitution, adding more fuel to the discussion for an enumerated
Bill of Rights. After much debate, more to do with the extent and geographical purview of the trial-by-jury protection, the Sixth Amendment,
which protects, among other things, “the right to a speedy and public
trial,” was adopted in 1789.51
For most of our country’s history, courts and legal scholars have
paid far more attention to the right of defendants to a speedy trial than to
the right to a public trial. There have only been two direct interpretations
by the Supreme Court with regard to a criminal defendant’s right to a
public trial. In both cases, the defendants requested their trials be made
open, and their requests were granted.52 The majority of other Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence involves a defendant seeking to avoid publicity in order to ensure a fair trial (i.e., a nonbiased jury) or the government
44. Charter Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey, supra note 43, at ch. XXIII (emphasis
added).
45. FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 17–18 (1st ed. 1969).
46. VA. BILL OF RIGHTS art. VII (1776).
47. N.C. CONST. art. IX (1776) (stating that proceedings shall be held “in open court”).
48. N.J. CONST. art. XVI (1776).
49. MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XIX (1776); N.J. CONST. art. XVII (1776).
50. See HELLER, supra note 45, at 24 (“The original Virginia plan contained no references
whatsoever to the procedure [for] criminal cases . . . .”). New Jersey, Hamilton, and Pinckney all
proposed language preserving the right to a trial by jury and Pinckney’s preserving open and public
trials. Id.
51. The limited information shows that the Amendment is essentially language from the ratifying convention in Virginia, which was itself based on a proposal of the Bill of Rights written by
George Mason. Id. at 34.
52. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
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seeking to protect a witness or to protect confidential information. The
Court has explicitly recognized that the right of an accused to a public
trial is to ensure that their trial is conducted fairly53 and is thus, not intended to eliminate the chance of an unbiased jury, but rather to avoid
governmental abuse of the system.
C. The History of Article I, Section 10 of the Washington
Constitution
The record surrounding the framing and adoption of the Washington constitution is unfortunately sparse. What the historical record does
show is that Article I, Section 10 of the Washington constitution exists in
its current form as it was initially proposed: “Justice in all cases shall be
administered openly, and without unnecessary delay.”54 We know that
there was an amendment proposed to this section on July 11, 1889,
(which was ultimately rejected) that would have changed the wording to:
“No court shall be secret but justice shall be administered openly and
without prejudice, completely and without delay and every person shall
have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person,
property or reputation.”55 We can speculate that the framers of the 1889
constitution likely had access to the state constitution proposed and ratified eleven years earlier, which never went into effect as the earlier efforts for Washington’s statehood were unsuccessful. The open courts
provision of the 1878 constitution, Article V, Section 9, read as follows:
Every person in the State shall be entitled to a certain remedy in the
law, for all wrongs and injuries which he may receive in his person,
character or property; justice shall be administered to all, freely and
without purchase; completely and without denial; promptly and
without delay; and all Courts shall be open to the public.56

Interestingly, this prior version of the provision more closely resembles
clause 40 of Magna Carta than the open courts provision of the constitution that was adopted in 1889. Furthermore, the earlier open courts provision specifically articulates the need for courts to be open to the public,
as compared to the vague language of the 1889 constitution requiring
53. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 (“Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his
trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been recognized
as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The
knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public
opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.”) (footnote omitted).
54. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10.
55. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITH
ANALYTICAL INDEX BY QUENTIN SHIPLEY SMITH 499 (Beverly P. Rosenow ed., 1962).
56. WASH. CONST. art. V, § 9 (1878), available at https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/legacy/1878
Constitution.pdf.
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only that “justice . . . be administered openly.”57 There is no evidence
that the framers intended Article I, Section 10 of the Washington constitution to guarantee a right to members of the public to access legal proceedings that is separate from the rights of litigants in the court system.
Neither historical documents at the time this provision was adopted, nor
contemporary court opinions support such a reading.
D. Recent Interpretations of Article I, Section 10
Between the adoption of the Washington constitution in 1889 and
1974, there were eighteen cases heard by the Washington State Supreme
Court in which Article I, Section 10 of the state constitution was referenced.58 Most of these cases made only a passing reference to Article 1,
Section 10,59 and referred only to the speedy trial provision of Article 1,
Section 10, or the ruling of the court is premised on the criminal defendant’s right to a public trail as articulated in Article 1, Section 22.60 Only
one of the cases, In re Lewis in 1957, included an analysis and interpretation of the public trial provision of Article I, Section 10.
In 1957, the In re Lewis court upheld a statute closing juvenile
court hearings, recognizing that such hearings are closed for the benefit
of the child that is the subject of the hearing.61 The court explained that
“[t]he purpose of excluding the public from proceedings such as these is,
of course, to protect the child from notoriety and its ill effects.”62 The
court went on to note that similar statutes in other states had been upheld.63
Therefore, prior to 1975, the Washington State Supreme Court had
not interpreted Article I, Section 10 to grant the public an independent
right of access to legal proceedings. The Cohen court was the first to do
so, claiming that the right of the public was generally recognized64 and
that Article I, Section 10 “entitle[d] the public . . . to openly administered
57. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10.
58. This search was conducted multiple times and occurred most recently on March 2, 2016.
59. See, e.g., N. Springs Water Co. v. City of Tacoma, 58 P. 773, 776 (1899) (company suing
for contract breach invokes Article I, Section 10 to secure equal “protection”); Rauch v. Chapman,
48 P. 253, 255 (1897) (listing open courts provision as part of larger discussion of the rights enumerated in the state constitution).
60. See, e.g., State v. Colson, 115 P.2d 677, 678 (1941); State v. Gaines, 258 P. 508, 514
(1923) (guaranteeing “to everyone accused of crime the right to a public trial”); see also State v.
Marsh, 217 P. 705, 705–06 (1923) (finding that an adult tried in juvenile court had not been granted
his constitutional right to a public trial).
61. In re Lewis, 316 P.2d 907, 910 (Wash. 1957).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Cohen v. Everett City Council, 535 P.2d 801, 802 (Wash 1975). For this proposition, the
court cited a Third Circuit case from 1958 and extrapolated the right of the media from the right of
the public. See Tribune Review Publ’g v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 884 (3d Cir. 1958).
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justice.”65 This was a dramatic leap in the court’s jurisprudence, yet the
court failed to acknowledge it at the time.
The Cohen case stemmed from the revocation of a city license for a
sauna parlor in Everett.66 The Everett City Council had considered the
matter in closed session pursuant to a statute that permitted the city
council to hold a closed session for such matters.67 The licensee moved
for an order sealing the transcript of the revocation hearing when appealing the revocation to the superior court.68 The licensee’s sealing motion
was granted, and a subsequent continuing order of confidentiality was
granted after the superior court upheld the city council’s decision to revoke the license.69 The Everett Herald, a daily newspaper, moved to have
the continuing order set aside so that the newspaper could have access to
the transcript.70 The issue before the Washington State Supreme Court
was limited to the validity of the continuing order of confidentiality.
Apart from articulating a new public right, the remainder of the
court’s decision was relatively modest. The court did not rule a statute
unconstitutional; rather, it found that there was a presumption of openness of court proceedings and that there were no grounds in the instant
case, statutorily or otherwise, for the transcript to remain confidential.71
The court explicitly recognized the validity of closed adoption hearings,
closed juvenile court proceedings, and other circumstances that justify a
court closure.72
Following Cohen, the courts in Washington have greatly expanded
public access to legal proceedings. In 1980, in Federated Publications,
Inc. v. Kurtz, a Washington appellate court held that the public had a
right to attend not only trials but also pretrial hearings.73 Concurrently, a
similar line of reasoning appeared at the federal level. The same year as
Kurtz, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment

65. Cohen, 535 P.2d at 803.
66. Id. at 802.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 803–04.
72. Id. at 803.
73. Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kurtz, 615 P.2d 440 (Wash. 1980). The court barred the press
and public from a pretrial suppression hearing in order to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial
under Article I, Section 22. Id. at 442. Although such a hearing occurs before trial, the court found
that it implicated sensitive evidentiary material that the public should be free to observe. Id. at 447.
In addition, the court noted the “significant textual difference” between the federal and state constitution on the matter of open court proceedings. Id. at 443. Because the public could observe the court
deciding whether or not to admit evidence and whether its decision was fair, the court extended the
independent right of public access to this type of “judicial proceeding” as well.
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to include a public right to attend legal proceedings.74 On one hand, there
is no textual equivalent to Article I, Section 10 in the federal Constitution. For this reason, the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the First Amendment is even more reliant on an inaccurate interpretation
of English common law. On the other hand, the jurisprudence of the
United States Supreme Court has not been as extreme as the Washington
State Supreme Court when it comes to the public’s right to access legal
proceedings and court documents.75
While Cohen was the first case to articulate an independent right of
the public to access legal proceedings, Seattle Times v. Ishikawa, heard
seven years later, became the seminal case defining the balance between
the public’s right to access legal proceedings and a party’s motion to
close a proceeding or seal a record.76 The Ishikawa case arose from State
v. Marler, in which defendant Cynthia Marler filed a motion to dismiss
the case and a motion to close the courtroom on her motion to dismiss.77
The prosecutor in the case concurred in Marler’s motion to close the
courtroom.78 The trial judge, Judge Richard Ishikawa, granted the motion
to close, denied the motion to dismiss, and sealed the records relating to
the motion to dismiss.79 Marler was subsequently convicted of murder.
The Seattle Times and The Seattle Post–Intelligencer challenged the closure and the sealing, a challenge that was eventually heard by the Washington State Supreme Court. Instead of making a final decision, the court
remanded the case and directed the trial court to consider a newly created
balancing test. According to the court, the proponent of the closure must
first demonstrate the need for closure. Second, anyone present must have
the opportunity to object to the closure. Third, the requested closure
should be the least restrictive means of closure. Fourth, the court must
weigh the competing interests of the public and of the proponent of closure.80 The test is sometimes interpreted as having a fifth factor, which is
that the closure order should be no broader in its application than is necessary to serve its purpose. Although, for practical purposes, the fifth
factor of the analysis is generally the same as the third factor. Subsequent
case law cites to these factors as the “Ishikawa factors.”81
74. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
75. This right has not been extended to civil proceedings, a distinction that some jurists in
Washington claim creates a heightened protection of the public’s right in this state.
76. See generally Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716 (Wash. 1982).
77. Id. at 717.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 720–21.
81. See, e.g., State v. Chen, 309 P.3d 410, 413 (Wash. 2013); Bennett v. Smith Bundy Berman
Britton, PS, 291 P.3d 886, 893 (Wash. 2013).
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The newly created balancing test—the “Ishikawa factors”—is complicated in a number of ways. First, it may be difficult to articulate a reason for requesting closure without divulging the information that the
proponent of the closure is seeking to protect. Second, if there is no party
objecting to the closure, the court must weigh the interest of the public in
the absence of an advocate seeking to protect the public’s interest.
Following the Ishikawa ruling, one of the most shocking open
courts rulings came in 1993 in Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry.82
The court in Eikenberry ruled a statute protecting juvenile victims of
sexual assault unconstitutional because the statute prohibited the disclosure of identifying information for all minor victims of sexual assault,
rather than permitting a case-by-case assessment of the need for closure.83 In Eikenberry, the court repeatedly referred to the Ishikawa factors as defining when and how court proceedings and court documents
could be closed.84 The court concluded by saying “any closure of traditionally open judicial proceedings is permissible under Const. art. 1, § 10
only if closure is necessary according to the guidelines this court previously defined in Kurtz and Ishikawa.”85
The message after Eikenberry was that the legislature cannot pass
laws protecting the privacy rights of Washington citizens if those laws
permit a court to seal a record. The exceptions are cases that were not
“traditionally open” and cases in which the legislature permitted an individualized assessment using the Ishikawa factors. Of course, a litigant
can always seek to close a hearing or seal a record using the Ishikawa
factors; thus, in practice, there is no way for the legislature to weigh in
on such issues.
As the state courts’ jurisprudence became more and more extreme,
litigants tested the boundaries of openness. Because Ishikawa and its
progeny require an individualized assessment, virtually any closure, no
matter how minor or incidental, could constitute grounds to overturn a
criminal conviction on appeal. Appeals were brought challenging convictions in which a sidebar was conducted outside the courtroom;86 jury
questionnaires in which jurors were asked about their personal experience with sexual assault were sealed;87 where a judge answered a ques-

82. Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 848 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1993).
83. Id. at 1259, 1261.
84. Id. at 1261.
85. Id. at 1262.
86. See State v. Smith, 334 P.3d 1049 (Wash. 2014).
87. See In re Stockwell, 248 P.3d 576 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
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tion from the jury in chambers;88 and where a defendant sought to seal
their competency evaluation in order to protect their privacy.89
In 2011, in In re Detention of D.F.F., the Washington State Supreme Court struck down Superior Court Mental Proceeding Rule 1.3,
which protected the privacy of individuals subject to involuntary commitment proceedings.90 The rule provided that involuntary commitment
proceedings “shall not be open to the public, unless the person who is the
subject of the proceedings or his attorney files with the court a written
request that the proceedings be public.”91 The rule was designed to protect the privacy interests of people who may not have the capacity or
wherewithal to protect their own privacy interests. The rule also permitted open proceedings if the subject or the subject’s attorney believed
public access was in the subject’s interest.92 However, once again, the
court gave greater weight to the abstract right to public legal proceedings
than to the concrete harms that may befall an individual who is subjected
to a public involuntary commitment hearing.93
Since 2009, the court has heard more than thirty cases involving interpretations of Article I, Section 10, making it one of the most litigated
issues before the court in recent years.94
E. Narrowing the Scope of the Public Right
Over the past several years, the Washington State Supreme Court
has recognized that requiring an in-depth individualized analysis whenever any aspect of a case is closed or sealed is unworkable. Rather, there
are only some aspects of a case and a case record that are presumptively
open and require an in-depth individualized assessment; other aspects of
a case, on the other hand, are not presumptively open. However, the
court has struggled to define what aspects of a case are presumptively
open.
In 2008, in State v. Sadler, a Washington appellate court distinguished between hearings on “purely ministerial or legal issues” and resolution of disputed issues of fact.95 The court reasoned that the presumption of openness applied only to resolution of disputed issues of fact.96
88. See State v. Sublett, 292 P.3d 715 (Wash. 2012).
89. See State v. Chao Chen, 309 P.3d 410 (Wash. 2013).
90. In re Det. of D.F.F., 256 P.3d 357 (Wash. 2011).
91. Wash. Sup. Ct. MPR 1.3 (rescinded effective Apr. 30, 2013).
92. Id.
93. In re D.F.F., 256 P.3d at 363.
94. The latest search to confirm the number was conducted March 2, 2016. The total number of
cases between 2009 and that date is 37.
95. State v. Sadler, 193 P.3d 1108 (Wash. 2008).
96. Id. at 1117.
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The court had similarly reasoned in State v. Rivera that “[t]he public trial
right applies to the evidentiary phases of the trial[] and to other ‘adversary proceedings.’”97 However, in 2012, the Washington State Supreme
Court rejected this analysis in State v. Sublett, relying instead on the
“Experience and Logic Test,” a test developed by the United States Supreme Court to interpret when the First Amendment required public access to criminal proceedings.98
The Experience and Logic Test, as adopted in Washington State, allows a court to make an initial determination about whether the court
proceeding or record that the litigant is seeking to close or seal is presumptively open. If the court determines that the proceeding or record is
presumptively open, then it must evaluate the requested closure using the
Ishikawa factors.99 However, evaluating whether the proceeding or document is presumptively open requires a two-part analysis. First, the court
asks “whether the place and process have historically been open to the
press and general public”100—the Experience Prong. Second, the court
must consider “whether public access plays a significant positive role in
the functioning of the particular process in question”101—the Logic
Prong. While neither prong is dispositive, the test provides a mechanism
for the court to weigh the historical and logical underpinnings of the need
for public access to a proceeding or a record.
Both the Experience and Logic Test and the Ministerial/Factual distinction have been roundly criticized by justices and by academics.102
Critics of the Experience and Logic Test argue that the test is so flexible
that it provides very little guidance for lower courts.103 Moreover, due to
its malleability, a court could reason its way to a conclusion of openness
or closure in any given case. Similar criticisms have been leveled at the
Ministerial/Factual distinction.104 It may be difficult for a court to draw
the line between the ministerial aspects of a proceeding and the factual
97. State v. Rivera, 32 P.3d 292, 296 (Wash. 2001).
98. Sublett, 292 P.3d at 722–23.
99. Id. at 722 n.8. The court refers to the Bone-Club factors, which is the term used when analyzing the public trial right under Article I, Section 22, the defendant’s right to a public trial. These
factors are identical to Ishikawa. Additionally, the Experience and Logic Test has been employed
directly in connection with Article I, Section 10; it is not exclusive to the public trial right of the
criminal defendant. See State v. S.J.C., 352 P.3d 749, 753 (Wash. 2015).
100. S.J.C., 352 P.3d at 753 (quoting In re Det. of Morgan, 330 P.3d 774, 781 (2014)).
101. Id. at 760.
102. See State v. Smith, 334 P.3d 1049, 1060 (Wash. 2014) (Wiggins, J., concurring); Anne L.
Ellington & Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser, In Washington State, Open Courts Jurisprudence Consists
Mainly of Open Questions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 491, 517–20 (2013).
103. Smith, 334 P.3d at 1060 (Wiggins, J., concurring) (stating that “[i]f ‘experience’ teaches
us anything, it is that there is no clear, meaningful way to define trial procedures” and listing how
the test can produce incongruous results interpreting seemingly identical court closures).
104. Sublett, 292 P.3d at 721.
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determinations. Also, there may be significant decisions that should be
presumptively open, which could be categorized as ministerial.
And yet, critics of both tests have concluded that some threshold
test was necessary. Prior to the court’s adoption of the Experience and
Logic Test, there seemed to be no way for the legislature to offer input
into what proceedings could be closed, and the lower courts were forced
to consider the Ishikawa factors every time a sidebar occurred or a juror
needed to answer an uncomfortable question in voir dire.
Despite the repeated criticisms of the Experience and Logic Test,
even the justices who initially opposed it in Sublett in 2012 now
acknowledge that the test constitutes stare decises. Accordingly, they
have subsequently signed onto opinions that use the test.105 Since the
adoption of this test, the court has begun to narrow its open courts jurisprudence. In State v. Sykes, the court ruled that because drug court staffings have not been traditionally open, there is no need for an individualized Ishikawa assessment.106 In State v. S.J.C., the court upheld a statute
that allows a juvenile offender to seal his record if the offender meets
certain requirements, again supporting limited access to the records of
juveniles.107
II. REBALANCING PRIVACY RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO OPEN COURTS
The Washington Supreme Court’s recent decisions reigning in its
previous jurisprudence acknowledge the importance of privacy in relation to the openness of legal proceedings and court records. As Washington courts and litigants continue to develop the parameters of the Experience and Logic Test, we hope to add to this discussion.
A. Acknowledging the Truth of Our Historical Experience
Washington courts and the United States Supreme Court have alluded to centuries-old traditions and English common law.108 When considering the Experience Prong of the Experience and Logic Test, courts
should acknowledge that English common law provided no explicit right
to publicly held legal proceedings. While there was a tradition in which
legal proceedings were scheduled at predetermined times and locations
such that the public could attend, there is no documented right of an ac-

105. In 2015, Justice Charles Wiggins, formerly one of the most outspoken critics of the test,
see supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text, signed on to an opinion which used the Experience
and Logic Test to uphold a statutory sealing standard. See S.J.C., 352 P.3d at 762.
106. State v. Sykes, 339 P.3d 972, 975–76 (Wash. 2014).
107. S.J.C., 352 P.3d at 753–54.
108. See supra note 4 and accompanying text, and source cited supra note 74.
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cused or a litigant to have their case heard in public.109 It was not until
colonial times, most notably in the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, that such a right was articulated.110
Second, prior to 1975, neither the United States Constitution nor the
Washington constitution were interpreted as granting a right to the public, separate and apart from the right of a litigant, to access legal proceedings and court documents.111 To the extent that such a right exists, it is
based on a relatively recent interpretation of Article I, Section 10 of the
Washington State constitution, or an even more recent interpretation of
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Third, we have a relatively limited experience of having documents
available online and searchable as it relates to the entire history of our
state. In the digital age, the risk of identity theft, stalking, or other misuse
of information made public because of a court proceeding is far greater
than it was when Article I, Section 10 was crafted. Therefore, the court
might articulate a lower bar for statutes or procedures that seek to prevent the misuse of information available online as compared to information available at the courthouse.
B. The Logic of Article I, Section 10
The Logic Prong of the Experience and Logic Test, as articulated
by the United States Supreme Court and adopted by the Washington Supreme Court, asks “whether public access plays a significant positive
role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”112 However,
when interpreting Article I, Section 10 of the Washington constitution,
the court should ask a related but slightly different question: Would the
closure or sealing prevent the public from evaluating the court’s administration of justice? All that the Washington constitution guarantees is the
open administration of justice. Ultimately, the purpose of public legal
proceedings is to ensure that the public can understand why and how the
court reached a particular decision.113 Unfortunately, the court has denied
sealing and redaction requests even when such requests would not interfere with the public’s ability to evaluate the court’s administration of justice.114
109. See supra text accompanying note 14.
110. See supra text accompanying note 51.
111. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
112. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside Cnty., 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
113. See e.g., Rufer v. Abbott Laboratories, 114 P.3d 1182, 1188 (Wash. 2005) (“We adhere to
the constitutional principle that it is the right of the people to access open courts where they may
freely observe the administration of civil and criminal justice.”) (citing Allied Daily Newspapers v.
Eikenberry, 848 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Wash. 1993).
114. See Hundtofte v. Encarnación, 330 P.3d 168 (Wash. 2014).

2016] Reconsidering the History of Open Courts in the Digital Age 1299
Second, the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial, which are
the rights litigants most commonly seek to protect when requesting a
court closure or the sealing of a record, are also constitutionally protected
rights.115 The harms that befall litigants through denial of these privacy
rights are real and concrete, and such harms are exacerbated by the readily available nature of information in the digital age.
Third, a dangerous attribute of the digital age is the pervasive nature of online records. Once a document, photograph, or transcript is
available to the public in electronic format, it can be impossible to erase.
There is no way to put the genie back into the bottle. Therefore, when an
individual’s privacy rights are at issue, the court should ensure that the
public’s right to access the information truly outweighs the privacy rights
of the litigant, as the litigant may never be able to recover from the public exposure of the information, particularly if the information turns out
to be false.
Taken as a whole, these concepts and historical perspectives should
help Washington courts and litigants to rebalance the privacy rights of
Washingtonians with respect to the right of the public to access legal
proceedings and documents.
III. REEVALUATING PREVIOUS DECISIONS
The authors respectfully suggest that the Washington State Supreme Court should reconsider some of its decisions by taking into consideration the above-described history and analysis. Three particularly
troubling decisions are Allied Daily Newspapers of Washington v. Eikenberry, In re Detention of D.F.F., and Hundtofte v. Encarnación.
While the statute protecting juvenile victims of sexual assault at issue in Eikenberry was broad, the court’s decision finding it unconstitutional was an overly broad reaction.116 Since Eikenberry, the legislature
has been reticent to make any effort to protect the privacy rights of
Washingtonians as they relate to court records because the Eikenberry
case appears to prohibit the legislature from allowing virtually any records to be sealed without an individualized analysis. Therefore, despite
living in a society where it has become easier for bad actors—
specifically, perpetrators of sexual assault—to misuse information available in court documents, very few limitations have been put in place to
protect the misuse of such information.
Using the framework of the Experience and Logic Test, if a court
were to reexamine the issue in Eikenberry, the court might note that there
115. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 22.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 82–85.
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is a long history of statutes that protect the privacy rights of juveniles.117
Additionally, there has been a history of judges limiting access to proceedings that include “salacious” testimony.118 When considering the
recently articulated right of the public to access legal proceedings, the
Experience Prong would seem to weigh in favor of permitting closure for
such proceedings. While the closure of such proceedings would undoubtedly inhibit the public’s ability to evaluate the court’s administration of
justice, the logic of closing proceedings in order to protect the privacy
rights of juveniles should weigh in favor of closure.
The most concerning aspect of In re Detention of D.F.F. is the fact
that subjects of involuntary commitment are no longer presumed to benefit from the protections of privacy offered by the prior version of the Superior Court Mental Health Proceedings Rule. The rule the court struck
down was put into effect in 1973, two years before the court recognized
an independent right of the public to attend legal proceedings.119 Therefore, there is a strong argument that the Experience Prong of the Experience and Logic Test would support the reinstatement of this rule. While
closure of the proceedings would inhibit the public’s ability to evaluate
the court’s administration of justice, we argue that the individuals’ privacy rights in these circumstances should trump the public’s right to access
such proceedings, particularly given the risk of misuse of such online
records.
Finally, despite the court’s adoption of the Experience and Logic
Test in 2012, the court failed to apply this test in the 2014 case
Hundtofte v. Encarnación.120 However, both the Experience Prong and
the Logic Prong weighed against the conclusion of the court’s leading
opinion. The tenants seeking redaction in Encarnación requested that the
court’s online index be redacted.121 It is important to note that the ability
of the public to access cases by searching for a defendant’s name in an
online database was a very recent development. It was not until 1993 that
all counties in Washington State started using the Superior Court Management Information System (SCOMIS), the index that the defendant in
Encarnación sought to redact.122 For the first one hundred years of
Washington’s history, the superior courts operated without the benefit of
an online information system. It was within the past thirty years that
117. See, e.g., State v. S.J.C., 352 P.3d 749, 754–56 (Wash. 2015).
118. Cohen v. Everett City Council, 535 P.2d 801, 803 (Wash. 1975).
119. See Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 848 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1993).
120. Hundtofte v. Encarnación, 330 P.3d 168 (Wash. 2014).
121. Id. at 171.
122. SCOMIS (Superior Court Management Information System), WASH. COURTS,
https://www.courts.wa.gov/jislink/?fa=jislink.scomis (last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (click on hyperlink
in 3d para.; then click on “Superior Courts”).
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online access to information has been developing and changing, although
the level of available information continues to differ in each county.
The Logic Prong of the Experience and Logic Test also weighs
against a finding that redacting the case name in SCOMIS constitutes a
court closure. The requested redaction would not limit the public’s ability to continue evaluating the court’s fairness. Even if Encarnación’s requested redaction had been granted, the public would still have been able
to locate the case in SCOMIS by the case number or the name of Encarnación’s landlord. Alternatively, a member of the public could request
bulk distributions of cases in order to evaluate unlawful detainer cases
generally, or proceedings heard by a particular judge.123 The public’s
lack of access to a defendant’s name in SCOMIS does not impair the
public’s ability to evaluate the court’s administration of justice.
We do not argue that the court should grant redaction requests
lightly. Washington Court Rule GR 15 provides a robust framework for
evaluating when a litigant has met the requirements necessary to redact
information.124 We simply argue that such a redaction request should not
require the constitutional analysis articulated in Ishikawa.
CONCLUSION
Moving forward, we hope Washington courts will use the Experience and Logic Test to continue to narrow the scope of cases that require
an individualized Ishikawa assessment. Other states have begun to take
measures to protect their citizens’ privacy rights in ways that the Washington Supreme Court’s jurisprudence now prevents the legislature from
doing. As an example, California law now prevents the dissemination of
erroneous eviction records by requiring that such cases be filed under
seal. The cases are unsealed only if the landlord prevails.125 This type of
measure will only be possible in Washington state if the Washington Supreme Court reexamines the historical basis for its broad interpretation of
Article I, Section 10 and rebalances the right of the public to access legal
proceedings and documents in relation to the privacy rights of the litigants themselves.

123. See Wash. GR 31(g).
124. Wash. GR 15.
125. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.2 (West 2013).

